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VACATION AND CORRECTION OF JUDGMENTS
IN WASHINGTON
PHIIP A. TR MAN*
After a judgment has been entered by a superior court, counsel is
sometimes confronted with the problem of what steps may be taken
to remedy alleged errors or mistakes. The obvious alternative is that
of appeal. There are, however, other possibilities which are perhaps
less widely known which may equally well serve to attain the end
sought. It is the purpose of this article to examine these other possi-
bilities for obtaining vacation and correction of judgments. The inquiry
will be directed to such questions as what grounds will suffice for ob-
taining relief, what procedures must be followed, and what are the
applicable time limitations in each instance.
To be distinguished from the vacation or setting aside of a judgment
is the correction of a judgment because of a clerical error. This involves
the matter of amending the judgment to make it correspond to the
facts and law as actually decided and applied. It has long been estab-
lished in Washington that a court has inherent power to modify a
judgment entry to make it conform to the judgment actually rendered1
Thus, if the court directs judgment for one party and the clerk enters
it for another or if the court directs a certain judgment and another
and different judgment is entered, this may be corrected.2
The leading case is O'Bryan v. American Investment & Improvement
Co.' A judgment was entered dismissing an action. Several months
later a petition was filed to have the judgment corrected to read that
the dismissal was without prejudice. An order to this effect had been
entered in the minutes prior to the entry of the judgment. The supreme
court reversed the trial court's denial of the requested relief and set
forth the principle of inherent power, independent of any statute.
-Further, the court stated that there was no discretion involved in' the
correction of an entry that concededly did not state the judgment of
the court.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 Pappas v. Taylor, 138 Wash. 31, 244 Pac. 393 (1926); Fisher v. Jackson, 120
Wash. 107, 206 Pac. 929 (1922) ; Litzell v. Hart, 96 Wash. 471, 165 Pac. 393 (1917);
Shaughnessy v. Northland S.S. Co., 94 Wash. 325, 162 Pac. 546 (1917).
2 McCaffrey v. Snapp, 95 Wash. 202, 163 Pac. 406 (1917).
s 50 Wash. 371, 97 Pac. 241 (1908).
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This inherent power is now embodied in Washington Rule of Plead-
ing, Practice and Procedure 60 as follows:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected
by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal
is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.4
Several points should be noted in conjunction with this rule. There
is no specified period of notice prescribed. In fact, it has been held
that a correction may be made without notice to the parties affected.5
The rule applies only to clerical errors and does not authorize a court
to change a judgment in substance as by correcting an error of law
contained therein or by recording a judgment that was never in fact
rendered.'
In In re Kramer's Estate" a will provided that the husband of the de-
ceased could use the principal of an estate as he might deem necessary
for his comfort and support. In making final distribution in 1950, the
superior court entered a decree to the effect that "in the event that it
is necessary for the surviving husband's comfort and support the court
so finds" the husband might use the principal.
Several years later, in 1956, a petition was filed to correct the decree
by deleting the phrase "and the court so finds," which was not con-
tained in the will. The superior court granted the relief sought and this
was affirmed. The supreme court stated that if it was the intention of
the trial court to include the phrase, there was no clerical error and
there could be no correction under Rule 60. However, if it was unin-
tentional, correction could be had. It was found that the secretary of
the attorney who submitted the decree for the judge to sign had made
a mistake in typing the decree. This was not discovered at the time by
either the attorney or the judge. Rule 60 thus applied. The case is of
consequence not only as indicating what will be considered as a clerical
error, but also as illustrating that there is no fixed time limitation for
relief under the rule, six years having elapsed in this instance.
One final illustration of the power of a superior court to correct
clerical errors is evidenced by cases wherein an appeal has been taken
4 The Washington rule is taken from FED. R. Crv. P. 60(a).
5 Barough v. Israel, 46 Wn.2d 327, 281 P.2d 238 (1955).
6 Rajewski v. Dart, 51 Wn.2d 52, 315 P.2d 636 (1957).
749 Wn.2d 829, 307 P.2d 274 (1957).
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with error being assigned which might have been corrected by the
superior court if called to its attention. In such instances, the supreme
court has directed correction but has denied the appellant his costs.
In one case this was done where there was an error in designating the
date for commencement of the running of interest and in another
where there was ambiguity in the judgment as to the amount of
damages.9
There are other bases for obtaining correction and vacation of judg-
ments than that of clerical errors. These are provided for by several
statutes scattered throughout the code. Before considering the scope
and application of each, note should be taken of some general prin-
ciples which apply to all of the provisions, except as otherwise in-
dicated.
In the discussion which follows concerning vacation of judgments,
reference is had to the final judgment. In the case of oral informal
opinions of.a judge,10 interlocutory orders,' and minute entries by a
clerk 2 the court retains jurisdiction to modify and change them with-
out regard to the statutes applying to vacation. Even as to the judg-
ment itself, it may be recalled by the judge prior to its entry by the
clerk without regard to the statutory provisions." It is only after the
judgment has been signed by the judge and filed with the clerk that
its vacation is dependent upon the statutory and. rule provisions here-
after discussed.1'
It is ihe court which rendered the judgment whose powers will be
considered. Except in certain instances wherein a collateral attack is
possible, a court of co-ordinate or concurrent jurisdiction may not
vacate a judgment. Stated affirmatively, in the case of a direct attack,
as under the statutory provisions or by an independent suit in equity,
only the court wherein a judgment is entered or an appellate court may
vacate it 1 Applying these propositions to the courts of Washington,
8 Gordon v. Hultin, 146 Wash. 61, 261 Pac. 785 (1927).
9 Coluccio v. State, 189 Wash. 236, 64 P.2d 786 (1937)..lo Lasell v. Beck, 34 Wn.2d 211, 208 P.2d 139 (1949) ; Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Wash.
153, 300 Pac. 518 (1931); North River Transp. Co. v. Denney, 149 Wash. 489, 271
Pac. 589 (1928) ; Quigley v. Barash, 135 Wash. 338, 237 Pac. 732 (1925) ; Landry v.
Seattle, P. A. & W. R. Co., 100 Wash. 453, 171 Pac. 231 (1918).
11lBalfour-.Guthirie Inv. Co. v. Geiger, 20 Wash. 579, 56 Pac. 370 (1899).1 2 Shaw v. Morrison, 145 Wash. 420, 260 Pac. 666 (1927).
Is State ex rel. Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash 397 72 Pac. 86 (1903).
14 Valley Iron Works v. Independent Bakery, 171 Wash. 349, 17 P.2d 898 (1933);
Wagner v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 70 Wash. 210, 126 Pac. 434 (1912). To the effect
that a judgment is entered as of the date it is signed by the judge and delivered to the
clerk for filing, regardless of the time when the clerk actually records it, see Canzler
v. Mammoliti, 40 Wn,2d 631, 245 P.2d 215 (1952) and Cinebar Coal & Coke Co. v.
Robinson, 1 Wn.2d 620, 97 P2d 128 (1939).
15 Rowe v. Silbaugh, 96 Wash. 138, 164 Pac. 923 (1917).
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it follows that the superior court of one county has no power to enter-
tain a direct attack upon the judgment of the superior court of another
county.16
As to the matter of time within which vacation must be sought, at
common law a judgment could be vacated during the term at which
the judgment was rendered. In Washington terms of courts do not
exist as at common law either for the supreme court" or for the superior
courts." It has been said that in Washington judgments have no pro-
bationary period in the sense that they are subject to the control of
the court and subject to being set aside, vacated or modified by it on
its own motion as were judgments at common law during the term at
which they were entered. On the contrary, judgments regularly entered
after the time within which a motion for a new trial may be filed, imme-
diately have all the conclusiveness of a judgment at common law after
term and can only be modified or vacated in the manner and for some
one or more of the causes provided by the statutes for vacating or
modifying judgments."
Only a party or one in privity with him may seek vacation.2" This
is true as to each of the statutory provisions and to an independent suit
in equity. Neither a stranger to the record nor the court on its own
motion may make the application. 2' Thus an attorney having an un-
paid balance due him by one of the parties to a divorce proceeding was
held not to be entitled to move to set aside the decree of divorce, even
though the decree had been procured by another attorney without a
substitution of attorneys and in violation of legal ethics. Not having
been a party to the proceeding, he had no legal right to have the judg-
ment set aside. However, if a judgment were completely void as by
the failure to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court
by effective summons, there is the possibility that the court under its
inherent power might vacate upon its own motion and perhaps even
upon the motion of a stranger to the record if his interests were directly
and injuriously affected by the judgment. Certainly this would be the
exceptional case due to the possible danger of affecting the rights of
16 In re Higdon, 30 Wn.2d 546, 192 P.2d 744 (1948).
17 WASH. CONST., art IV, § 2 provides: "The said court [supreme court] shall
always be open for the transaction of business except on nonjudicial days."
18 RCW 2.08.030 provides: "The superior courts are courts of record, and shall be
always open, except on nonjudicial days."
19 McCaffrey v. Snapp, 95 Wash. 202, 163 Pac. 406 (1917) ; State ex rel. McConihe
v. Steiner, 58 Wash. 578, 109 Pac. 57 (1910).
20 Kuhn v. Mason, 24 Wash. 94, 64 Pac. 182 (1901) ; State ex rel. Dodge v. Lang-
home, 12 Wash. 588, 41 Pac. 917 (1895).
21 State ex rel. McConihe v. Steiner, 58 Wash. 578, 109 Pac. 57 (1910).
22 State ex rel. Breuner v. Superior Court, 166 Wash. 502, 7 P.2d 604 (1932).
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parties. And, in any event, such a stranger could not demand the vaca-
tion as a matter of right, but rather would have to depend upon the
exercise of discretion by the court.2"
The proposition that only parties of record may seek the vacation
of a judgment does not mean that all the parties to the original action
must be joined in the vacation proceedings. If the parties interested
in the proceedings are joined and the interests of all will be protected,
a technical defect in the failure to join all will not be fatal. It is not
necessary, in short, to have the same plaintiffs and defendants as in
the original proceedings.24
Another principle of general application is that much discretion rests
with the trial court. The result is that considerable deference is given
to the trial court determination.25 This is particularly true in the case
of applications for the vacation of default judgments, which are the
most common instances wherein requests for vacation arise.2 6 In ex-
ercising such discretion in the case of 'default judgments, the primary
duty of the court is to inquire whether or not the moving party has
a defense of merits. If it clearly appears that a strong defense exists,
the court will not inquire closely into the reasons resulting in the entry
of the default.2 Further, in the case of default judgments, the relief
requested is to be liberally construed and the supreme court is less
likely to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion where
vacation is granted than where denied." On the other hand, if there
has been full opportunity at the trial for determining the merits of
the case, greater caution is to be exercised in vacating judgments."
This is particularly true where strong considerations -of public policy
arise as with divorce decrees.8"
One final point of general applicatioh is that a court in vacating a
judgment is not limited to an all or nothing exercise of discretion.
It may impose conditions upon the grant or denial thereof.81
28 Ballard Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Linden, 188 Wash. 490, 62 P.2d 1364 (1936).
24 Morrison v. Morrison, 25 Wash. 466, 65 Pac. 779 (1901).
-25Kuhn v. Mason. 24 Wash. 94, 64 Pac. 182 (1901).
28 Pederson v. Klinkert, 156 Wash. Dec. 326, 352 P.2d 1025 (1960) ; Rule v. Somer-
vili, 150 Wash. 605, 274 Pac. 177 (1929) ; Hurley v. Wilson, 129 Wash. 567, 225 Pac.
441 (1924). "
27Yeck v. Department of Labor & Indus., 27 Wn,2d 92, 176 P.2d 359 (1947).
28 Agricultural & Livestock Credit Corp. v. McKenzie, 157 Wash. 597, 289 Pac. 527
(1930); Aid v Bowerman, 132 Wash. 319, 232 Pac. 297 (1925).
29 State v. Roff, 44 Wn.2d 309, 266 P.2d 1059 (1954); McDougall v. Walling, 21
Wash. 478, 58 Pac. 669 (1899).
30 Winstone v. Wrinstone, 40 Wash. 272, 82 Pac. 268 (1905); Meter v. Meter, 32
Wash. 494, 73 Pac. 535 (1903).81 Melosh v. Graham, 122 Wash. 299, 210 Pac. 667 (1922); Hendrix v. Hendrix,
101 Wash. 535. 172 Pac. 819 (1918).
56 Agricultural & Livestock Credit Corp. v. McKenzie, 157 Wash. 597, 289 Pac. 527
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It has been said many times that a court cannot vacate or modify a
judgment in the absence of statutory grounds." A striking illustra-
tion of this principle is Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford."3 The
state supreme court affirmed a judgment granting a permanent injunc-
tion restraining state officers from collecting an excise tax on the use
of property brought into the state which was not procurable within
the state. Afterwards the United States Supreme Court rendered con-
trary decisions, the state supreme court in a later, separate opinion
changed its views, holding such tax collectible on such property, and
the state legislature amended the taxing act to specifically cover such
property and made the tax retroactive. Nevertheless, it was held that
since none of this fit within the grounds specified by statute, the judg-
ment could not be vacated. On the other hand, if there are sufficient
statutory grounds appearing on the record, an application to vacate
a judgment may be granted, although such grounds are not relied upon
by the party seeking relief. 4 Of course, the grounds must not have
been previously passed upon by the court in conjunction with some
other motion, as for a new trial,35 and there must not have been a
consent to the entry of the judgment."
Though the court sometimes speaks as if the statutory grounds and
procedures are exclusive, the possibility of an independent suit in
equity or a collateral attack remains, as will be discussed later. Most
attacks upon judgments rest upon a statutory basis, however, and they
require initial consideration.
The most important statutory provisions relating to vacation of
judgments are to be found in RCW 4.72Y RCW 4.72.010 sets forth
the grounds upon which vacation may be had. Of the eight grounds
listed, the principal ones for present consideration are in the last six
subdivisions."8
The most commonly relied upon ground for vacation is prescribed
32 State ex rel. Lundin v. Superior Court, 90 Wash. 299, 155 Pac. 1041 (1916);
Okazaki v. Sussman, 79 Wash. 622, 140 Pac. 904 (1914) ; In re McKeever's Estate,
48 Wash. 429, 93 Pac. 916 (1908).
33 199 Wash. 462, 92 P.2d 214 (1939).
84 Smith v. Smith, 36 Wn.2d 164, 217 P.2d 307 (1950).
85 Friedman v. Manley, 21 Wash. 675, 59 Pac. 490 (1899) ; Greene v. Williams, 13
Wash. 674, 43 Pac. 938 (1896).36 Arnot v. Fischer, 161 Wash. 67, 295 Pac. 1116 (1931).
38 Though at one time it was held that RCW 4.72 was applicable to criminal as well
as civil judgments, the more recent interpretation is that a judge has power to vacate
criminal judgments which extends beyond the grounds stated in RCW 4.72.010. Com-
pare State v. Scott, 101 Wash. 199, 172 Pac. 234 (1918) with In re McNutt v. Delmore,
47 Wn.2d 563, 288 P.2d 848 (1955).
38 RCW 4.72.010(1) provides that a judgment may be vacated or modified: "By
granting a new trial for the cause, within the time and in the manner, and for any of
the causes prescribed by the rules of court relating to new trials." A general discus-
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in subdivision three as follows: "For mistakes, neglect or omission of
the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order." It must
first be noted that this is interpreted to mean any mistake or neglect
which warrants modification or vacation in the furtherance of justice
and not just mistakes or neglect of the clerk." The mere establish-
ment of a mistake, however, is not sufficient; it must result in a judg-
ment that is wrongful or oppressive." In addition, in a recent 5-4
decision it was determined that a mistake of fact is not included with-
in the meaning of the statute. A contention was made that a judgment
for a minor resulted from a mutual mistake of fact in that the parties
at the time of a compromise settlement did not realize the full severity
or extent of the minor's injuries. It was held that even if true, this
would not justify a vacation of the judgment, barring fraud or collu-
sion.41 What type of mistake or neglect then does meet the require-
ment of the statute?
Clearly a mistake by the clerk is included. Thus, if the clerk enters
a judgment contrary to the directions of the judge42 or enters a judg-
ment upon an informal or oral order of the judge,"" it may be vacated
under subdivision three.
Mistakes of parties are likewise included if found to be excusable
in character rather than wilful." Where the defendant left the state
shortly before the hearing, intending not to return, and to place prop-
erty in a sister state beyond the reach of the court, the neglect was
wilful and vacation of a default judgment was denied.45 The deter-
mination of whether the mistake or neglect alleged is sufficient rests
primarily in the discretion of the trial court." This is illustrated very
well by comparing Moe v. Wolter, which held-there was sufficient
mistake to justify vacation where a party did not appear on an attor-
ney's advice upon receipt of mailed notice in a foreign state, with
sion of new trials is beyond the scope of this comment. See, WASH. RULE PLEADING,
PRACTICE, PROCEDURE 59.04W, RCW 4.76, and Denny-Renton Clay & Coal Co. v.
Sartori, 87 Wash. 545, 151 Pac. 1088 (1915).
RCW 4.72.010(2) provides for vacation: "By a new trial granted in proceedings
against defendant served by publication only as prescribed in RCW 4.28.200." This
basis for vacation will be discussed separately in detail later.
30 National Bank of Commerce v. L. Kilsheimer & Co., Inc., 59 Wash. 460, 110
Pac. 15 (1910).
40 Northern Pac. & P. S. S. R. R. v. Black, 3 Wash. 327, 28 Pac. 538 (1891).
41 Handley v. Mortland, 54 Wn.2d 489, 342 P.2d 612 (1959).
42 Hartford v. Stout, 102 Wash. 241, 172 Pac. 1168 (1918).
4- Wiggins v. Shaw, 99 Wash. 408, 169 Pac. 853 (1918) ; Shaughnessy v. Northland
S.S. Co., 94 Wash. 325, 162 Pac. 546 (1917).
44 Bishop v. Illman, 14 Wn.2d 13, 126 P.2d 582 (1942).
45 Hendrix v. Hendrix, 101 Wash. 535, 172 Pac. 819 (1918).
46 Dow v. Dow, 135 Wash. 188, 237 Pac. 304 (1925); Jordan v. Hutchinson, 39
Wash. 373, 81 Pac. 867 (1905).
7 134 Wash. 340, 235 Pac. 803 (1925).
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Rule v. Somervill, s which held there was not sufficient mistake where
the party failed to appear as a result of his own reliance upon the
law of the foreign state rather than the law of Washington. The two
cases also give a clue as to the difference in meaning of wilful and
excusable neglect.
Examples of mistake or neglect by a party deemed to be excusable
in character, thereby justifying vacation are: where the failure to ap-
pear resulted from the party assuming another person would defend;49
where the party had relied upon an out of court settlement and failed
to appear;50 where the failure to appear resulted from summons being
served upon a corporation officer who was unfamiliar with legal pro-
ceedings; 5 where the defendant did not understand English and had
been told an attorney was protecting his rights; 52 where the party made
a mistake in noting the return day beyond the time when an answer
should have been made;" and where the party made a mistake as to
the date of service of summons upon him.54 In all of these instances,
application for vacation was made promptly upon discovery of the mis-
take or neglect. A failure to act with dispatch may result in denial
of an otherwise valid ground for vacation.55
Just as the mistake or neglect of a party may justify vacation if
excusable, so the same is true of counsel. Vacation was justified where
an attorney left the state and the substituted attorney was not fully
acquainted with the facts;56 where the attorney incorrectly noted the
day for answering; " and where misunderstanding arose between the
parties' counsel as to the method of notice for trial." Vacation was
properly denied where a default judgment resulted simply from a want
of attention by counsel;59 where counsel for the plaintiff obtained a
voluntary dismissal and the statute of limitations thereby barred fur-
ther recovery;"0 and where the attorney withdrew from the case with-
out leave of court, thereby resulting in nonappearance and a default.61
48 150 Wash. 605, 274 Pac. 177 (1929).
49 Jacobsen v. Defiance Lumber Co., 142 Wash. 642, 253 Pac. 1088 (1927) ; Cam-
marano v. Longmire, 99 Wash. 360, 169 Pac. 806 (1918).
'0 McBride v. McGinley, 31 Wash. 573, 72 Pac. 105 (1903).
51 Spoar v. Spokane Turn-Verein, 64 Wash. 208, 116 Pac. 627 (1911).
S2 Paltro v. Gavenas, 97 Wash. 327, 166 Pac. 1156 (1917).
53 Mt. Vernon Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Monroe, 104 Wash. 107, 176 Pac.
13 (1918).
54 Titus v. Larsen, 18 Wash. 145, 51 Pac. 351 (1897).
55 See Frieze v. Powell, 79 Wash. 483, 140 Pac. 690 (1914).
56 Agricultural & Livestock Credit Corp. v. McKenzie, 157 Wash. 597, 289 Pac. 527
(1930).
57 Reitmeir v. Seigmund, 13 Wash. 624, 43 Pac. 878 (1896).
58 O'Toole v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 39 Wash. 688, 82 Pac. 175 (1905).
59 Green v. Russell, 71 Wash. 379, 128 Pac. 645 (1912).
co Anderson v. Shields, 51 Wash. 463, 99 Pac. 24 (1909).
61 McInns v. Sutton, 35 Wash. 384, 77 Pac. 736 (1904).
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Attempts have at times been made to modify or vacate judgments
under subdivision three on the ground that the judgment entered did
not accord with the unexpressed intent of the judge. Such attempts
have generally failed. In one instance the judge in a criminal case sen-
tenced the defendant to the state penitentiary. Later it was sought to
modify this by providing that confinement should be in the reforma-
tory, which the judge stated was his intention. It was held that such
an unexpressed intention was not within the meaning ,of the word
"mistake." 2 The same result was reached where the judge inadvert-
ently omitted from the decree a provision for the repayment of money.
His unexpressed intention did not justify a vacation. 8 Likewise, the
'inclusion in a judgment of a provision which the court did not intend
to require has been held not to be a ground for vacation. 4 Contrary
to the above cases is Morsbach v. Thurston County, 5 where the court
held that vacation would lie where the judgment included an award
of damages when it was only intended to adjudicate the title to prop-
erty. The case may be qualified by the fact that there was no evidence
to support an award of damages as required by law. Barring that,
the case seems inconsistent with the others cited and- seemingly stands
alone on the question of what constitutes ground for vacation under
subdivision three. -It would seem that it would be more proper to seek
relief in such an instance under Washington Rule of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure 60, as previously discussed.
Subdivision three also provides for vacation in the event of "irregu-
larity in obtaining a judgment or order." An irregularity is defined to
be the want of adherence to some prescribed rule or mode of proceed-
ing; it consists either in omitting to do something that is necessary for
the due and orderly conducting of a suit or doing it at an unseasonable
time or in an improper manner.6 If the irregularity in procedure re-
sults in the deprivation of a substantial right, vacation is in order. 7
Examples of irregularities justifying vacation are the conducting of a
proceeding to determine the question of insanity of an alleged insane
person without a jury after one was demanded; the entering of a pre-
62 State ex reL. Lundin v. Superior Court, 90 Wash. 299, 155 Pac. 1041 (1916).
68 McCaffrey v. Snapp, 95 Wash. 202, 163 Pac. 406 (1917).
64 Schmelling v. Hoffman, 124 Wash. 1, 213 Pac. 478 (1923).
65 148 Wash. 87, 268 Pac. 135 (1928).
66 Merritt v. Graves, 52 Wash. 57, 100 Pac. 164 (1909).
67 State v. Gallagher, 46 Wn.2d 570, 283 P.2d 140 (1955). The trial court in pro-
-nouncing judgment and sentence failed to ask the defendant if he had any legal cause
to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him. This was an irregularity,
but since no showing of deprivation of a substantial right was made, a motion to vacate
was denied.
68 it re Ellern, 23 Wn.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 (1945).
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mature final judgment when only an interlocutory order was proper;69
the entering of a judgment of dismissal on the court's own motion on
the ground of insufficiency of the complaint, while issues of fact were
pending; 0 and the denial of a constitutional right or privilege in con-
nection with an arraignment or plea.7' In each instance it will be noted
that there was some deviation of a substantial character from the regu-
larity in procedures. If the deviation is unsubstantial, as delay in en-
tering a default judgment,72 or a failure to obtain possession of the
plaintiff's brief before judgment,73 vacation is improper.
In a few instances cases can be grouped according to the type of
irregularity. If there is a want of proper service of process, the proper
procedure is to move for vacation of the judgment upon the basis of
an irregularity.7" Thus, if summons is mailed to the wrong address, 7
if summons by publication misstates the object of the action,76 or if
summons recites that the complaint has been filed with the clerk when
such is not true,77 there is such an irregularity as to justify vacation.
The requirement of proper notice carries over to other procedures
than that of summons and the original service of process. A failure to
give notice to parties of subsequent proceedings after appearance, 8 or
notice of the appointment of a guardian, 9 or notice of an order for
change of judge,8" or notice of a request for a nonresident cost bond8
justifies the vacation of the subsequent order or judgment.
It is also possible that the judgment itself may be so defective as to
constitute an irregularity. This is true, for example, in the case of a
default judgment beyond the purport and scope of the pleadings82 or a
judgment which fails to conform to a jury verdict and an applicable
statute.83
Much confusion has arisen in the cases in the courts' attempts to
distinguish between irregularities and errors of law. The distinction
09 Muscek v. Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 25 Wn.2d 546, 171 P.2d 856 (1946).
70 State ex rel. Hennessy v. Huston, 32 Wash. 154, 72 Pac. 1015 (1903).
71 State v. Taft, 49 Wn.2d 98, 297 P.2d 1116 (1956).
72 First Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 80 Wash. 376, 141 Pac. 884 (1914).
73 State ex rel. Grady v. Lockhart, 18 Wash. 531, 52 Pac. 315 (1898).
74 American Discount Corp. v. Gerrard, 156 Wash. 271 ,286 Pac. 666 (1930) ; Ash-
craft v. Powers, 22 Wash. 440, 61 Pac. 161 (1900) ; Brewer v. Howard, 59 Wash. 580,
110 Pac. 384 (1910) ; Wheeler v. Moore, 10 Wash. 309, 38 Pac. 1053 (1894).
75 State ex rel. Cole v. Blake, 123 Wash. 336, 212 Pac. 549 (1923).
70 Hays v. Peavey, 54 Wash. 78, 102 Pac. 889 (1902).
77 Golson v. Carscallen, 155 Wash. 176, 283 Pac. 681 (1930).
78 C. S. Barlow & Sons v. H. & B. Lumber Co., 153 Wash. 565, 280 Pac. 88 (1929);
Molloy v. Union Transfer, Moving & Storage Co., 60 Wash. 331, 111 Pac. 160 (1910).
79 State ex rel. Lowary v. Superior Court, 41 Wash. 450, 83 Pac. 726 (1906).
80 State ex rel. Dunham v. Superior Court, 106 Wash. 507, 180 Pac. 481 (1919).
81 Harringer v. Keenan, 117 Wash. 311, 201 Pac. 306 (1921).
82 Stark Brothers v. Royce, 44 Wash. 287, 87 Pac. 340 (1906).
83 Seattle & Mont. Ry. v. Johnson, 7 Wash. 97, 34 Pac. 567 (1893).
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has been drawn upon the basis that irregularities justify vacation
whereas errors of law do not. For the latter the only remedy is by
appeal from the judgment."' The power to vacate for irregularity is
not to be used by a court as a means to review or revise its judgments
or to correct mere errors of law into which it may have fallen. Of
course, viewing the matter from the opposite side, the fact that an
order is appealable for error of law does not limif the court's power
to vacate for irregularities contained therein. 5
An error of law is committed when the court, either upon motion
of one of the parties or upon its own motion, makes some erroneous
order or ruling on some question of law which is properly before it
and within its jurisdiction to make. 6 An irregularity has reference to
something extraneous to the action of the court or goes to the question
of the regularity of the proceedings."T
The difficulty arises not in determining the difference in definition
between the two, but in applying the definitions to diverse factual
situations. Errors of law have been held to include the failure of arbi-
trators to determine all the questions presented,88 improperly restrict-
ing proof to certain elements of damage, 9 the fixing of an executor's
compensation in excess of a statutory allowance, 0 the failure of the
record in a divorce decree to show an allegation and finding as to the
residence of the plaintiff or any finding of the specific facts upon which
the decree rested,8 misconstruction of statutes,92 and improper rulings
on the qualifications of jurors and the admissibility of evidence."
Viewing the problem more generally it appears that an irregularity is
regarded as a more fundamental wrong, a more substantial deviation
from procedure than an error of law. An irregularity is deemed to be
of such character as to justify the special remedies provided by vaca-
tion proceedings, whereas errors of law are deemed to be adequately
protected against by the availability of the appellate process. Other
than that, the most that can be said is that it must be left for the court
in each instance to classify. Though this is most unsatisfactory from
8 4 Hurley v. Wilson, 129 Wash. 567, 225 Pac. 441 (1924).8 5 Morsbach v. Thurston County, 148 Wash. 87, 268 Pac. 135 (1928) ; In re John-
ston's Estate, 107 Wash. 25, 181 Pac. 209 (1919).88In re Ellern, 23 Wn2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 (1945).87 Kern v. Kern, 28 Wn.2d 617, 183 P.2d 811 (1947).
88 McElroy v. Hooper, 70 Wash. 347, 126 Pac. 925 (1912).
89 Okanogan-Douglas Inter-County Bridge Co. v. McPherson Bros. Co., 152 Wash.
58, 277 Pac. 380 (1929).
90 In re Doane's Estate, 64 Wash. 303, 116 Pac. 847 (1911).
91 Faulkner v. Faulkner, 90 Wash. 74, 155 Pac. 404 (1916).
02 Kuhn v. Mason, 24 Wash. 94, 64 Pac. 182 (1901).93 In re Ellern, 23 Wn.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 (1945).
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the standpoint of prediction, it is necessary in order to enable the court
to evaluate the many diverse factors alleged to justify vacation.
Subdivision four of RCW 4.72.010 provides for vacation "for fraud
practiced by the successful party in obtaining the judgment or order."
The chief point to note in this respect is that the fraud must be ex-
trinsic or collateral in character. 4 This requires some intentional act
or conduct by which the prevailing party has prevented the unsuccess-
ful party from having a fair submission of the controversy.95 As in
other instances of alleged fraud, it must be actual and positive in char-
acter and not merely constructive; it must be established by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence.99
Instances where extrinsic or collateral fraud have been found include
intentional failure to give notice of hearing to the adverse party after
the latter's appearance,97 intentional mailing of summons to the wrong
address,99 intentional misleading of a party as to the nature of the ac-
tion," intentional misleading as to the time of trial,' and intentional
procurance of an ex parte decree by a wife in a separate maintenance
action without disclosing a prior release of the husband from all obli-
gation to support her.""'
Perhaps more enlightening is an analysis of some cases where suffi-
cient fraud to justify vacation was not found." 2 In In re Christian-
son's Estate'° a motion was made to vacate a decree of distribution in
probate on the ground that the administrators did not disclose to the
court the existence of certain nieces and nephews entitled to share in
the estate. The court found that due notice had been given and con-
cluded there was no fraud justifying vacation of the decree. One may
assume that if representations had been made to the nieces and neph-
ews that it was unnecessary for them to appear and protect their rights
94 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (3) which provides for the vacation of a judg-
ment for fraud by an adverse party "whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic."
95 Wood v. Copeland Lumber Co., 41 Wn.2d 119, 247 P.2d 801 (1952).
96 Burke v. Northern Pac. Ry., 86 Wash. 37, 149 Pac. 335 (1915).
97 State ex rel. LeRoy v. Superior Court, 149 Wash. 443, 271 Pac. 87 (1928).
98 Rowe v. Silbaugh, 107 Wash. 518, 182 Pac. 576 (1919).
99 State ex rel. Weidert v. Superior Court, 36 Wash. 81, 78 Pac. 198 (1904).
100 Bast v. Hysom, 6 Wash. 170, 32 Pac. 997 (1893).
101 Smith v. Smith, 36 Wn.2d 164, 217 P.2d 307 (1950).
102 In some instances the allegations, though true, simply have not constituted fraud.
A party's failure to disclose evidence which would defeat his claim is not fraudulent.
Burke v. Bladine, 99 Wash. 383, 169 Pac. 811 (1918) ; McDougall v. Walling, 21 Wash.
478, 58 Pac. 669 (1899). The violation of an oral agreement between attorneys does
not constitute fraud under subdivision four in view of WASH. RULE PLEADING, PRAC-
TICE, PROCEDURE 89.04W requiring such agreements to be in writing. Muscek v.
Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n, 25 Wn.2d 546, 171 P.2d 856 (1946).
10 16 Wn.2d 48, 132 P.2d 368 (1942).
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or that they would participate in the decree of distribution, extrinsic
fraud would have been found. In such an instance there would 'have
been intentional conduct preventing a fair determination of the con-
troversy.
Numerous cases have arisen in which an attempt has been made to
obtain vacation on the basis of perjured testimony at the trial. It is
clear that perjury alone does not constitute fraud sufficient under sub-
division four to justify the vacating of a judgment.1°4 It is necessary
that the circumstances be such as to relieve the party seeking vacation
of all implication of want of diligence and to deceive him completely
as to the nature of the testimony."5 Perhaps if it could be established
that the adverse party had intentionally procured the perjured testi-
mony and that the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have
discovered this, the necessary extrinsic or collateral fraud would be
found.
Situations may arise where it will be difficult to determine whether
the ground for vacation is "fraud practiced by the successful party"
or "mistake, omission or neglect." Suppose a party in asking for relief
chooses a ground different from the one the court deems applicable.
Is relief to be denied? The court has indicated that it will not engage
in refined distinctions in distinguishing between "fraud" and "mis-
take."108 Presumably the same, attitude will, and should, prevail in
the interpretation and application of all grounds for vacation. Other-
wise, one may be denied relief because of a technical error in having
guessed wrong in choosing among the numerous and sometimes am-
biguous statutory provisions.
Subsection five authorizes vacation "for erroneous proceedings
against a minor or person of unsound mind, when the condition of such
defendant does not appear in the record, nor the error in the proceed-
ings." This provision has been given a narrow construction. Assuming
that a proper person is appointed as guardian and that he properly
represents the minor or incompetent person, and absent fraud upon
the guardian or collusion by the guardian with the adverse party,
104 Huseby v. Kilgore, 32- Wn.2d 179, 201 P.2d 148 (1948) ; Burke v. Bladine, 99
Wash. 383, 169 Pac. 811 (1918); Friedman v. Manley, 21 Wash. 675, 59 Pac. 490(1899) ; McDougall v. Walling, 21 Wash. 478, 58 Pac. 669 (1899).
105 Doss v. Schuller, 47 Wn.2d 520, 288 P.2d 475 (1955).
106 Hull v. Vining, 17 Wash. 352, 49 Pac. 537 (1897). This case is of consequence
also in indicating that if the ground for the vacation relates to a defense rather than
to an affirmative claim, there is greater reason for allowing vacation. If vacation is
denied in the case of the defense, there is no other relief available, whereas in the
instance of an affirmative claim, another action may be instituted assuming a statute
of limitations has not run.
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minors and incompetents are bound the same as other persons.117 No
distinction is otherwise recognized under the subsection between a
decree in favor of or against infants and a decree to which adults only
are parties, and the same invalidating vice must be found in the one
case as in the other.'08
Subsection eight should be considered in conjunction thereto. Vaca-
tion is allowed "for error in a judgment shown by a minor, within
twelve months after arriving at full age." Where it is sought to vacate
a decree on the ground of error shown under this subsection, the error
must clearly appear upon the face of the record in the original pro-
ceedings and must be such error as would have entitled the minor to
a reversal of the decree upon appeal, had he been under no disability
at the time of its entry and in a position to prosecute an appeal. 109
The principal effect of the subdivision is to extend the period within
which vacation may be had. The minor may seek vacation within one
year after arriving at majority. Thus a minor acting within one year
after arriving at majority was able to obtain the vacation of a judg-
ment awarding all of his mother's property to her surviving husband
for error in admitting oral evidence to vary a will which failed to
mention the children of the testator."'
Vacation may be had under subdivision six "for the death of one
of the parties before the judgment in the action." Care should be
taken in such an instance to abide by the statutory procedures for
vacation, as explained below, as it has been said that such a judgment
is only voidable within the time and manner provided by statute and
not void so as to authorize a collateral attack."' Finally, subsection
seven authorizes vacation "for unavoidable casualty, or misfortune
preventing the party from prosecuting or defending." There has been
little litigation involving the meaning of this provision. It would ap-
pear that it has reference to such things as sicknesses, accidents, or
perhaps death in the immediate family of one of the parties, such as
to prevent the party from prosecuting or defending.
The time limit within which application must be made for vacation
under RCW 4.72 is one year after the entry of the order, judgment or
107 In re Hardison, 28 Wn.2d 921, 184 P.2d 840 (1947) ; Burke v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 86 Wash. 37, 149 Pac. 335 (1915) ; Kromer v. Friday, 10 Wash. 621, 39 Pac. 229
(1895).
108 Handley v. Morton, 54 Wn.2d 489, 342 P.2d 612 (1959).
109 Wilson v. Hubbard, 39 Wash. 671, 82 Pac. 154 (1905) ; Ball v. Clothier, 34
Wash. 299, 75 Pac. 1099 (1904).
110 Morrison v. Morrison, 25 Wash. 466, 65 Pac. 779 (1901).
11 Gordon v. Hillman, 109 Wash. 223, 186 Pac. 651 (1919) ; Hotchkin v. Bussell,
46 Wash. 7, 89 Pac. 183 (1907).
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decree in question."' It is one year from the entry and not from
the time of discovery of the mistake, omission, irregularity or other
ground." 3 After the elapse of a year the only remedy available for
the vacation of a judgment is an independent action in equity or a
collateral attack." 4 This does not mean that the party may elect to
seek vacation under the statutes within the year or wait and bring an
independent action in equity after the elapse of a year. He has no such
election. If the ground is discovered within the year, as fraud, the
statutory remedy is exclusive. A failure to apply during the year will
result in the denial of relief later should an independent suit be
initiated." 5
The requirements for statutory vacation are not met from a time
standpoint simply by filing an application some time within the year.
Due diligence must be exercised and any unreasonable or unexplained
laches in applying for relief may result in the denial thereof." 6 Thus
where one sought vacation within three days of the expiration of the
year without any showing of diligence, relief was denied." 7
By virtue of Washington Rule on Appeal 15, once notice of appeal
is given the supreme court acquires jurisdiction of the case. The supe-
rior court is then without power pending the appeal to vacate, change
or modify the judgment."' Further, a judgment of the superior court,
appealed to the supreme court and determined upon its merits, be-
comes in effect a judgment of the supreme court. The superior court
is without power after its remand to vacate or otherwise modify it
except in such manner as may be necessary to carry out the mandate
of the supreme court." 9 This latter rule is subject to the qualification,
however, that the supreme court will, upon a proper showing made
112 WASH. RULE PLEADING, PRAcrcE, PROCEDURE 60.04W; Collins v. Sea Prod. Co.,
124 Wash. 625, 214 Pac. 15 (1923) ; Spokane Valley Power Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
99 Wash. 557, 169 Pac. 991 (1918) ; Krohn v. Hirsch, 81 Wash. 222, 142 Pac. 647
(1914).
13 Scottish Am. Mortgage Co., Ltd. v. Stone, 132 Wash. 487, 232 Pac. 289 (1925);
Nevers v. Cochrane, 131 Wash. 225, 229 Pac. 738 (1924).
114 State ex rel. Boyle v. Superior Court, 19 Wash. 128, 52 Pac. 1013 (1898).
"15 Batey v. Batey, 35 Wn.2d 791, 215 P.2d 694 (1950).
116 Dawson v. Carstens, 98 Wash. 96, 167 Pac. 86 (1917) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 56
Wash. 571, 106 Pac. 138 (1910) ; Bozzio v. Vaglio, 10 Wash. 270, 38 Pac. 1042 (1894).
117 Kuhn v. Mason, 24 Wash. 94, 64 Pac. 182 (1901).
11s Kawabe v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 214, 169 Pac. 329 (1917) ; Gust
v. Gust, 71 Wash. 75, 127 Pac. 556 (1912) ; Inland Nursery & Floral Co. v. Rice, 56
Wash. 21, 104 Pac. 1117 (1909) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v.'Thompson, 34 Wash. 610, 76 Pac.
105 (1904) ; Canada Settlers Loan & Trust Co. v. Murray, 20 Wash. 656, 56 Pac. 368
(1899) ; State ex rel. Mullen v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 376, 46 Pac. 402 (1896). -
119 State ex rel. Seattle v. Superior Court. 1 Wn.2d 630, 96 P.2d 596 (1939) ; Rich-
ardson -v. Sears, 87 Wash. 207. 151 Pac. 504 (1915) ; Pacific Drug Co. v. Hamilton,
76 Wash 524, 136 Pac. 1144 (1913) ; Kath v. Brown, 53 Wash. 480, 102 Pac. 424,
(1909) - State rx rel. Jefferson County v. Hatch, 36 Wash. 164, 78 Pac. 796 (1904);
State cx rel. Wolferman v. Superior Court, 8 Wash. 591, 36 Pac. 443 (1894).
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within the year, grant leave to apply to the lower court for the vaca-
tion of a judgment affirmed by the supreme court.' It is to be stressed
that the mere fact that leave to move against the judgment is granted
by the supreme court does not justify vacation by the trial court. The
applicant must still qualify under the statutory grounds for vacation. 1
Also it is to be noted that the time during which the appeal is pend-
ing is not counted as part of the time within which the applicant is
required to move against the judgment for its vacation. 2
One other point relating to the year limitation is that the fact the
judgment is subject to vacation for that period does not prevent it
from being final in character. Execution may be had and the judg-
ment may be enforced in another state by a suit for a judgment there-
on during the year. Any grounds for vacation tried and determined
in the other state in the suit on the judgment are res judicata and bar
an application to vacate the judgment in this state on the same
grounds."'
Assuming that proper statutory grounds are established and that
the party acts diligently within a year in seeking vacation, the ques-
tion may be posed as to what steps must be followed. Washington Rule
of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 60.04W prescribes the procedure
and, in doing so, in effect supersedes several parts of RCW 4.72.
Application is to be made by motion filed in the cause stating the
grounds upon which relief is asked, and supported by the affidavit of
the applicant or his attorney setting forth a concise statement of the
facts or errors upon which the motion is based, and if the moving
party be a defendant, the facts constituting a defense to the action or
proceeding. A failure to supply such affidavit will result in a denial of
the motion even if adequate grounds are stated in the motion. 4 Care
should be taken to strictly abide by the rule as to the contents of the
motion and affidavit.
12 5
Upon the filing of the motion and affidavit, the court will enter an
order fixing the time and place of the hearing thereof and directing all
120 Doss v. Schuller, 47 Wn.2d 520, 288 P.2d 475 (1955) ; Donaldson v. Greenwood,
40 Wn.2d 238, 242 P.2d 1038 (1952) ; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford, 199 Wash.
462, 92 P.2d 214 (1939) ; Haaga v. Saginaw Logging Co., 170 Wash. 93, 15 P.2d 655
(1932) ; Post v. City of Spokane, 35 Wash. 114, 76 Pac. 510 (1904) ; State ex rel.
Post v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 53, 71 Pac. 740 (1903) ; Post v. City of Spokane,
28 Wash. 701, 69 Pac. 371 (1902).
121 Gudmundson v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 160 Wash. 489, 295 Pac. 167
(1931).
122 1; re Shilshole Avenue, 101 Wash. 136, 172 Pac. 338 (1918).
123 Harju v. Anderson, 133 Wash. 506, 234 Pac. 15 (1925).
124 State v. Gallagher, 46 Wn.2d 570, 283 P.2d 140 (1955).
:125 Roberts v. Shelton S.W.R.R., 21 Wash. 427, 58 Pac. 576 (1899).
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parties to the action or proceeding who may be affected thereby to
appear and show cause why the relief asked for should not be granted.
The motion, affidavit and order to show'cause are to be served upon
the parties affected in the same manner as in the case of summons in
a civil action at such time before the date fixed for the hearing as the
order shall provide. If such service cannot be made, the order is to be
published as directed by the court and a copy of the motion, affidavit
and order mailed to the parties at their last known post office address
and another copy thereof served upon the attorneys of record such
time prior to the hearing as the court directs.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 60.04W, the procedures for vacation
specified in RCW 4.72 were exclusive, except for an independent suit
in equity or a collateral attack. 26 With the adoption of Rule 60.04W,
it became exclusive to the extent of its coverage and such statutory
provisions'as are inconsistent therewith are abrogated.'27 Applying this
principle, the following statutes should be deemed to be superseded in
whole or in part: (1) RCW 4.72.020 provides that the proceedings for
the vacation of a judgment for mistakes or omissions of the clerk or
irregularities in obtaining the judgment shall be by motion served on
the adverse party or his attorney within one year. This subject is now
covered completely by Rule 60.04W.' (2) RCW 4.72.030 provides
that proceedings for vacation under RCW 4.72.010(2) through (7)
shall be by petition verified by affidavit setting forth the judgment, the
facts or errors constituting a cause to vacate it, and if the party is a
defendant, the facts constituting a defense to the action. In providing
for a petition, the statute is inconsistent with Rule 60.04W and should
be deemed abrogated. Likewise, the contents of the affidavit are now
governed by the rule. The only part of RCW 4.72.030 which remains
effective is that part providing that proceedings shall be begun within
one year after the judgment is entered, unless the party entitled there-
to is a minor or person of unsound mind, in which case the time limit
1
2 6 Betz v. Tower Say. Bank, 185 Wash. 314, 55 P.2d 338 (1936) ; State ex reL. Post
v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 53, 71 Pac. 740 (1903); Whidby Land & Dev. Co. v. Nye,
5 Wash. 301, 31 Pac. 752 (1892).
.27 RCW 2.04.200 provides: "When and as the rules of courts herein authorized
shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further
force or effect."
128 The statute is cited in Pederson v. Klinkert, 156 Wash. Dec. 326, 352 P.2d 1025
(1960) for the proposition that a proceeding for vacation must be commenced within a
year after the judgment is entered. It would seem that reliance might better have been
placed upon Rule 60.04W. The authority of the case for the proposition that RCW
4.72.020 remains in effect is weakened by the fact that the court relied upon the statute
as providing the time limit for proceedings under subdivisions four and seven of RCW
4.72.010 when by its very wording RCW 4.72.020 had reference only to subdivision
three of RCW 4.72.010.
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is one year from the removal of such disability. (3) RCW 4.72.040
provides for the procedure upon the filing and service of a petition.
As the rule makes no provision for a petition, the statute is superseded
in this respect. Except as specified below, the statute and rule other-
wise cover the same matter and the rule should be deemed to supplant
the statute accordingly."'
While the above statutes should be deemed abrogated to the extent
indicated, the question remains as to what effect the decisional law
construing the statutes has under the rule. At one time there was some
confusion in the cases as to whether a motion or a petition was the
proper method for applying for vacation due to the existence of both
RCW 4.72.020 and 4.72.030."' This is now clarified by the rule in
providing for a motion and accompanying affidavits in all instances.
Service of the application for vacation under the statutes could be
made upon either the party or his attorney of record.' Rule 60.04W
now provides for service "upon all parties affected in the same man-
ner as in the case of summons in a civil action," if such service can
be made, and if not, then it must be made by publication, plus service
on the attorney of record. This clearly requires personal service on
the adverse party, if possible, and service on the attorney of record
will not suffice in the ordinary case.132
RCW 4.72.040 provides in part that "the facts stated in the petition
shall be demed denied without answer." Though the petition no longer
exists, a case decided since the adoption of the rule has held that no
answer is required to raise an issue of fact in the event of an appli-
cation to vacate a judgment. 3 A striking illustration that the quoted
provision in the statute survives is Caldwell v. Caldwell."4 It was held
that where a motion to vacate a judgment was filed, issues of law and
fact were presented which were deemed denied without answer. As the
plaintiff failed to bring the issues before the court for decision within
one year, the motion was subject to dismissal for want of prosecu-
tion under Washington Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure
41.04W(a). The case also illustrates that while the court under Rule
60.04W is directed to fix the time and place of hearing of the order
129 See WASH. RULE PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE (Appendix), Memorandum 4,
List of Superseded Statutes and Explanation of the List, by Professor Robert Meisen-
holder.
130 Mt. Vernon Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 104 Wash. 107, 176 Pac. 13 (1918);
Spokane & Idaho Lumber Co. v. Stanley, 25 Wash. 653, 66 Pac. 92 (1901).
131 Foster v. Foster, 130 Wash. 376, 227 Pac. 514 (1924) ; Harju v. Anderson, 125
Wash. 161, 215 Pac. 327 (1923).
132 State ex rel. Gaupseth v. Superior Court, 24 Wn.2d 371, 164 P.2d 890 (1946).
133 In re Ellern, 29 Wn.2d 527, 188 P.2d 146 (1947).
134 30 Wn.2d 430, 191 P.2d 708 (1948).
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to show cause, the obligation to timely procure such an order rests
upon the moving party.
Though no answer was necessary under the statute, one might be
filed if it did not introduce a new cause.135 This resulted from the con-
cluding provision of RCW 4.72.040 that the "defendant shall introduce
no new cause, and the cause of the petition shall alone be tried." Such
an interpretation, while restricting the issues to the cause stated in the
application to vacate, enabled the defendant to establish any defense
he might have to the application. It appears that this is not incon-
sistent with the provisions and purposes of Rule 60.04W and that an
answer may still be filed subject to the stated conditions.
There is authority, since the adoption of the rule, allowing the filing
of a demurrer to an application to vacate.'86 This would now be in the
form of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.' Under RCW 4.72.040 one could waive the
benefit of the statutory denial by a demurrer to the application to va-
cate on the ground it did not state sufficient facts and by then stand-
ing on the demurrer if it was overruled. 8 It appears that a motion to
dismiss would have the same effect under Rule 60.04W.
RCW 4.72.040 provided for the trial of disputed issues of fact. To
refuse to try such issues was error.' Likewise, there i's provision in
the rule for a hearing to determine factual questions. The court may
try the issues itself or may elect to have them determined by a jury.
Because of the equitable character of the proceedings, however, such
jury determination is advisory only and is not binding upon the court. 40
Also on the matter of factual issues, at one time it was not necessary
for the judge to make formal findings of fact in support of orders
vacating judgments. 4' Such are now required.4 2
Finally, on the subject of what remains of RCW 4.72.040, there is
authority since the adoption of the rule supporting the proposition
that vacation proceedings should be conducted in the same way, as
near as can be, as in an original action. 48 It appears that RCW
4.72.040 should be deemed still effective to the following extent:
1s5 Harju v. Anderson, 133 Wash. 506, 234 Pac. 15 (1925).
.6 it re Ellern, 23 Wn.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 (1945).
1
8 7 WASH. RULE PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE 7(c) and 12(b).
138 State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 405, 269 Pac. 1 (1928);
Meeker v. Meeker, 117 Wash. 410, 201 Pac. 786 (1921).
's9 Baer v. Lebeck, 126 Wash. 576, 219 Pac. 22 (1923).
140 Roth v. Nash, 19 Wn.2d 731, 144 P.2d 271 (1943).
14i Frieze v. Powell, 79 Wash. 483, 140 Pac. 690 (1914).
142 WASH. RULE PLEADING, PRACTICE, PROCEDURE 52.04W.
143 Wood v. Copeland Lumber Co., 41 Wn.2d 119, 247 P.2d 801 (1952).
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[Except as provided by Washington Rule of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure 60.04W] all the proceedings [shall be] conducted in the
same way, as near as can be, as in original action by ordinary pro-
ceedings, except that the facts stated in the [motion] shall be deemed
denied without answer, and defendant shall introduce no new cause,
and the cause of the [motion] shall alone be tried.
Such a construction would not conflict with Rule 60.04W and would
eliminate those areas where the rule and statute on their face now cover
the same matter.
Though there are instances where RCW 4.72 is superseded or modi-
fied by Rule 60.04W, several provisions of the chapter remain effective.
This is indicated by the wording of the rule itself, "Except as modified
by this rule RCW 4.32.240, 4.72.010 - .090, shall remain in full force
and effect." One provision that still has particular significance is RCW
4.72.050, which provides:
The judgment shall not be vacated on motion or petition until it is
adjudged that there is a valid defense to the action in which the judg-
ment is rendered; or, if the plaintiff seeks its vacation, that there is a
valid cause of action; and when judgment is modified, all liens and
securities obtained under it shall be preserved to the modified judgment.
Except for the italicized phrase "or petition" the statute is unaffected
by the rule and remains in full effect. By virtue of the statute, an alle-
gation that the petitioner has a meritorious cause of action or defense
is a necessary condition for the vacation of a judgment.'44
Considering a defendant's application first, there must be a clear
showing of a prima facie defense on the merits.'4 5 It is necessary to
set out the facts showing the prima facie defense as a bare statement
or allegation is insufficient."" At the hearing on the motion to vacate,
the court will not decide the merits of the controversy, but will only
determine whether the facts alleged constitute a defense and whether
there is substantial evidence to support the matters of defense so
alleged.'
Even if a party alleges and proves facts constituting a prima facie
defense, the granting or denial of the vacation is still within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. 4 This is qualified somewhat by the fact that
144 Handley v. Mortland, 54 Wn.2d 489, 342 P.2d 612 (1959).
145 Hoefer v. Sawtelle, 43 Wash. 23, 85 Pac. 853 (1906) ; Williams v. Breen, 25
Wash. 666, 66 Pac. 103 (1901).
146 Pefound v. Gagnon, 172 Wash. 311, 20 P.2d 17 (1933); Hurley v. Kwapil, 156
Wash. 225, 286 Pac. 664 (1930).
147 State ex tel. Nelms v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 24, 267 Pac. 775 (1928);
Russell v. Union Mach. & Supply Co., 100 Wash. 208, 170 Pac. 565 (1918).
14s Lasell v. Beck, 34 Wn.2d 211, 208 P.2d 139 (1949).
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where the probability of a meritorious defense is strong, less will be
required on the question of cause for vacation of the proceedings.149
On the other hand, if no cause for vacation is stated in the motion, it
will be denied regardless of the strength and character of the defense. 50
There are two instances in which an affidavit of a meritorious de-
fense need not be filed in order to obtain a vacation. The first is where
a default judgment is prematurely entered and the defendant appears
within the time required to avoid default."' Secondly, no affidavit of
a meritorious defense is necessary to vacate a judgment entered with-
out jurisdiction." 2
If it is a plaintiff who is seeking vacation, the statute requires that
he allege facts constituting a valid cause of action. In the ordinary
case, this in effect requires nothing of the plaintiff since-his cause of
action already appears in the complaint. In such instances, it is not
necessary to repeat the showing of a valid cause of action1 s
The remaining provisions of RCW 4.72 which remain effective may
be summarized briefly. Under RCW 4.72.060 the court may first try
and decide upon the grounds to vacate a judgment before trying and
deciding upon the validity of the defense or cause of action. Appellate
cases suggest that the court not only "may" do so, but should do so. 5'
RCW 4.72.070 allows for the obtaining of an injunction suspending
the proceedings when a vacation or modification is sought of a judg-
ment or order. If the proceedings are suspended and there is then a
denial of an application to vacate or modify a judgment or order for
the recovery of money, RCW 4.72.090 provides that damages may be
imposed against the applicant in the discretion of the court in addition
to the original amount of the judgment, not exceeding ten per cent on
the amount of the judgment.
Finally, RCW 4.72.080 provides that the provisions of the chapter
shall not be so construed as to affect the power of the court to vacate
judgments as elsewhere provided in the code. This necessitates a con-
sideration of other statutory provisions affecting vacation.
1 "0 Yeck v. Department of Labor & Indus., 27 Wn.2d 92, 176 P.2d 359 (1947) ;
Jacobsen v. Defiance Lumber, Inc., 142 Wash. 642, 253 Pac. 1088 (1927).150 Harter v. King County, 11 Wn.2d 583, 119 P.2d 919 (1941) ; Haynes v. Schwartz
Co., 5 Wash. 433, 32 Pac. 220 (1892).
151 Tiffin v. Hendricks, 44 Wn.2d 837, 271 P.2d 683 (1954) ; Batchelor v. Palmer,
129 Wash. 150, 224 Pac. 685 (1924) ; Hole v. Page, 20 Wash. 208, 54 Pac. 1123 (1898).
252 John Hancock Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, 196 Wash. 357, 83 P.2d 221 (1938) ;
Frieze v. Powell, 79 Wash. 483, 140 Pac. 690 (1914).; Sakai v. Keeley, 66 Wash. 172,
119 Pac. 190 (1911) ; Bennett v. Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees of the
World, 40 Wash. 431, 82 Pac. 744 (1905).
15s Harringer v. Keenan, 117 Wash. 311, 201 Pac. 306 (1921).
154 Harter v. King County, 11 Wn2d 583, 119 P.2d 919 (1941) ; Pringle v. Pringle,
55 Wash. 93, 104 Pac. 135 (1909).
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The most important of these is an easily overlooked clause in RCW
4.32.240. It is there provided that, "the court . . . may, upon such
terms as may be just, and upon payment of costs, relieve a party, or
his legal representatives, from a judgment, order or other proceeding
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excus-
able neglect."
Examples of adequate grounds for vacation under this statute in-
clude the inducing of a party not to appear at a hearing and to inter-
pose a defense on the basis that no personal judgment would be taken
against him and then having such a judgment entered;1.. the denial
of a new trial entered without notice, after an agreement to submit the
same at some future time to a visiting judge who died before the matter
was submitted;.5 6 and the entering of a default judgment where the
defendant believed in good faith that he had employed a lawyer to
defend the action, though such was not true.' It is readily apparent
that the grounds provided in RCW 4.32.240 are closely related to those
provided in RCW 4.72.010(3) and (7), which allow for vacation for
mistakes, neglect or omission of the clerk or irregularity in obtaining
a judgment or order, and for unavoidable casualty, or misfortune pre-
venting the party from prosecuting or defending. There is no indica-
tion that the court will indulge in refined distinctions requiring the
moving party to choose a particular ground. The court will be more
concerned with the relief sought and the objective sought to be at-
tained."5 8
Rule 60.04W applies to RCW 4.32.240 just as it does to RCW 4.72.
Consequently, the procedure is the same for both. There must be a
motion and supporting affidavits, both substantial grounds for relief
and a meritorious defense must clearly appear,'59 and there is the same
provision for the method of notice of the hearing. Discretion resides
with the trial court, the one year time limitation applies, and conditions
may be imposed upon the grant or denial of the requested relief. 6°
Finally, the trial court may not vacate its judgment under the section
for errors of law.' 6 '
15 Hull v. Vining, 17 Wash. 352, 49 Pac. 537 (1897).
156 Little Bill v. Dyslin, 51 Wash. 675, 99 Pac. 1026 (1909).
157 Kain v. Sylvester, 62 Wash. 151, 113 Pac. 573 (1911).
158 Hull v. Vining, 17 Wash. 352, 49 Pac. 537 (1897). But see Wheeler v. Moore,
10 Wash. 309, 38 Pac. 1053 (1894) where the court held that the proceeding must be
under RCW 4.72 rather than RCW 4.32.240 when the cause assigned for vacation was
that proper service had not been had upon the defendant.
159 Leavitt v. DeYoung, 43 Wn.2d 701, 263 P.2d 592 (1953).
160 Halter v. Spokane Soap Works Co., 12 Wash. 662, 42 Pac. 126 (1895).
161 In re Jones' Estate, 116 Wash. 424, 199 Pac. 734 (1921).
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A statute requiring specialized treatment is RCW 4.28.200. Subdi-
vision two of RCW 4.72.010 allows for vacation, "by a new trial
granted in proceedings against defendant served by publication only
as prescribed in RCW 4.28.200."
RCW 4.28.200 provides:
If the summons is not served personally on the defendant.., he or
his representatives, on application and sufficient cause shown, at any
time before judgment, shall be allowed to defend the action and, except
in an action for divorce, the defendant or his representative may in
like manner be allowed to defend after judgment, and within one year
after the rendition of such judgment, on such terms as may be just;
and if the defense is successful, and the judgment, or any part thereof,
has been collected or otherwise enforced, such restitution may there-
upon be compelled as the court directs.
The statute is restricted to those instances in which service is by
publication. In authorizing a defendant to defend on a showing of
"sufficient cause," the evident intent is to provide the trial court in
such instances with a greater discretion in granting a vacation -than
in the case of personal service of process. As the court has said:
It [the statute] did not take away any rights possessed by parties
having judgments rendered against them, but gave additional rights
to parties having judgments rendered against them upon service by
publication. In the absence of this provision, a judgment rendered
upon service by publication could not be set aside for any different
reason than could other judgments. 162
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the statute was
adopted several years after the adoption of RCW 4.72 and RCW
4.32.240.
As indicated, an action initiated by personal service of summons
does not come within the statute. Likewise, the section does not apply
to service of summons void on its face or a judgment entered without
summons of any kind. Rather the statute contemplates an application
based upon matters outside the record when there has been service by
publication, as in a case where a judgment has been entered on a cause
of action to which the defendant has a meritorious defense and where
he has in fact had no actual notice nor opportunity to present his de-
fense. 62 Particular note should be taken that actions for divorce are
excluded from the benefit of the statute.6 This does not, however,
162 Chaney v. Chaney, 56 Wash. 145, 151, 105 Pac. 229, 232 (1909).,
163 Sturgiss v. Dart, 23 Wash. 244, 62 Pac. 858 (1900).
364 Winstone v. Winstone, 40 Wash. 272, 82 Pac. 268 (1905) ; Metler v. Metler, 32
Wash. 494, 73 Pac. 535 (1903) ; McCord v. McCord, 24 Wash. 529, 64 Pac. 748 (1901).
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preclude an attack upon a divorce decree obtained by service by pub-
lication for fraud under RCW 4.72.165
The statutes previously discussed comprise all of the statutory
grounds for the vacation of judgments except in a single class of cases,
namely, actions to recover possession of real property where the service
is by publication and a default judgment is given for failure to answer.
RCW 7.28.260 provides that in such cases the defendant, or his suc-
cessor in interest, shall be entitled, upon application made at any time
within two years from the rendition of the judgment and upon the
payment of the costs of the action, to an order vacating the judgment
and granting him a new trial. Attempts to extend the statute beyond
actions to recover possession have been unsuccessful. The statute has
been held not to apply to actions to set aside fraudulent conveyances,166
actions to forfeit land contracts,167 actions to establish lost bounda-
ries,168 or quiet title actions. 69
In addition to the statutory bases for seeking the vacation of judg-
ments, one may under some circumstances institute an independent
action in equity to have a judgment set aside. One of the most com-
mon grounds asserted for such relief is that of fraud practiced by the
successful party in procuring the judgment. As in the case of fraud
asserted under the statutory provisions as a ground for vacation, it
must be extrinsic in character.'
If the fraud is discovered within one year of the judgment, the pro-
ceedings for vacation must be instituted under the statutory provisions
as the procedure set forth therein is exclusive.' One may not elect to
wait and begin a separate equitable action later."2 If a year has elapsed
at the time of the discovery of the fraud, it is not possible to seek re-
lief by motion in the original action. It is then necessary to institute
a suit in equity.'
165 Chaney v. Chaney, 56 Wash. 145, 105 Pac. 229 (1909); Graham v. Graham, 54
Wash. 70, 102 Pac. 891 (1909); McDonald v. McDonald, 34 Wash. 293, 75 Pac. 865
(1904).
16 6 Jordon v. Hutchinson, 39 Wash. 373, 81 Pac. 867 (1905).
167 Smith v. Stiles, 68 Wash. 345, 123 Pac. 448 (1912).
168 Strunz v. Hood, 44 Wash. 99, 87 Pac. 45 (1906).
169 Bruhn v. Pasco Land Co., 67 Wash. 490, 121 Pac. 981 (1912).
170 Farley v. Davis, 10 Wn.2d 62, 116 P.2d 263 (1941).
17, Batey v. Batey, 35 Wn.2d 791, 215 P.2d 694 (1950) ; Muller v. Hendry, 171 Wash.
9, 17 P.2d 602 (1932) ; State ex rel. Post v. Superior Court, 31 Wash. 53, 71 Pac. 740
(1903).
172 Long v. Eisenbeis, 18 Wash. 423, 51 Pac. 1061 (1898).
173 Nevers v. Cochrane, 131 Wash. 225, 229 Pac. 738 (1924) ; Twigg v. James, 37




If the fraud is discovered after the elapse of a year, one must make
seasonable application for equitable relief. Any unexplained laches
may result in denial of the requested relief 1  It has been further held
that the maximum period for obtaining relief from a judgment on the
ground of fraud, even by an independent equitable action, is three
years from the time of discovery of the-fraud.' To be contrasted with
this is the situation where, instead of instituting an independent action
for relief, the party sets up the alleged fraud as an equitable defense
to a suit on the judgment. Such an equitable defense is not barred by
any statute of limitations or by laches as long as a right of action on
the judgment survives; the defense may be made whenever the judg-
ment is sought to be enforced 17
If one timely seeks the vacation of a judgment by motion in accord-
ance with the rules and statutes and this is denied, he is precluded in
any subsequent proceeding, whether it be by motion or an independent
action, from obtaining the same relief. 77 Thus, as an example, the
denial of a timely motion to vacate a judgment for fraud bars a subse-
quent action in equity to set aside the judgment178
Just as a motion in the original proceedings- to vacate- a judgment
must be made in the court rendering the judgment, so, likewise an in-
dependent suit must be initiated there. No court other than that which
rendered the judgment may grant the equitable relief." 9 The statutory
and rule provisions setting forth the procedures for obtaining vacation
do not, however, apply in the case of an independent suit for equitable
relief.180 Instead, one must institute an original action by serving pro-
cess upon the party and the matter will be tried out as any other ordi-
nary suit in equity."8'
Another common ground alleged for equitable relief is lack of juris-
diction to render the judgment. A judgment entered without jurisdic-
1.74 Anderson v. Burgoyne, 60 Wash. 511, 111 Pac. 777 (1910); Washington
Dredging & Improvement Co. v. State, 53 Wash. 346, 101 Pac. 884 (1909).
175 Rowe v. Silbaugh, 96 Wash. 138, 164 Pac. 923 (1917) ; Peyton v. Peyton, 28
Wash. 278, 68 Pac. 757 (1902).
176 State ex rel. American Freehold-Land Mortgage Co. v. Tanner, 45 Wash. 348,
88 Pac. 321 (1907).
177 Kelley v. Sakai, 72 Wash. 364, 130 Pac. 503 (1913) ; Newell v. Young, 59 Wash.
286, 109 Pac. 801 (1910) ; Bunch v. Pierce County, 53 Wash. 298, 101 Pac. 874 (1909).
178 Muller v. Hendry, 171 Wash. 9, 17 P.2d 602 (1932).
170 Compare, Rowe v. Silbaugh, 96 Wash. 138, 164 Pac. 923 (1917) where action
brought in Pacific County to set aside judgment of King County was not allowed, with
later case of Rowe v. Silbaugh, 107 Wash. 518, 182 Pac. 576 (1919) where action
brought in King County was allowed.
'so Spokcane Co-Operative Mining Co. v. Pearson, 28 Wash.. 118, 68 Pac. 165 (1902).
181 Foster v. Foster, 130 Wash. 376, 227 Pac. 514 (1924) ; State ex rel. Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Superior Court, 101 Wash. 144, 172 Pac. 336 (1918). '
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tion may be attacked directly, i.e., under the statute or in equity,
regardless of whether the defect appears by the record or not. 2 Evi-
dence outside the record is admissible. There is, of course, a presump-
tion of jurisdiction which must be overcome by clear and convincing
proof." 3 The mere fact that defects appear in the record is not sufficent
proof to overcome the presumption as it will be presumed that juris-
diction was properly acquired by means not shown in the record.'
However, evidence clearly establishing that personal service was not
had upon the defendant or that land involved was not within the county
would be sufficient. The fact of a recital in the judgment that juris-
diction existed.85 or a statement in the return of a sheriff that proper
service was made 88 does not preclude an attack upon the judgment.
There is no time limit as a judgment entered without jurisdiction is
void. 7 The court has said that this is true without regard to laches. 8
It may be assumed that circumstances might be such, as for example
reliance by a third party on the judgment, that equitable considerations
would weigh against vacating the judgment should too long a time
elapse. This is for the court to determine in its discretion. Just as the
one year statutory time limit does not apply, so likewise it is not
necessary to show a defense upon the merits. The law requires no
showing other than that the defendant was, in fact, not served with
process or that there was no jurisdiction over the subject matter. This
results from the fact that the power to vacate such judgments does not
arise from the statutes or rule; it is an inherent power of the court. 9
One may elect to proceed in the original action in accordance with
the statutes and rule or he may proceed by an independent equitable
suit to attack a judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Upon the termination
of one, he may not then proceed under the other, as an adverse judg-
ment in one proceeding is a bar to an action for similar relief under a
different name or in a different form.' Thus, where the defendant
182 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, 196 Wash. 357, 83 P.2d 221 (1938) ;
Hurby v. Kwapil, 156 Wash. 225, 286 Pac. 664 (1930) ; Chehalis Coal Co. v. Laisure,
97 Wash. 422, 166 Pac. 1158 (1917) ; Bennett v. Supreme Tent of the Knights of the
Maccabees of the World, 40 Wash. 431, 82 Pac. 744 (1905); Scott v. Hanford, 37
Wash. 5, 79 Pac. 481 (1905) ; Dane v. Daniel, 28 Wash. 155, 68 Pac. 446 (1902).
183 Northwestern & Pac. Hypotheek Bank v. Ridpath, 29 Wash. 687, 70 Pac. 139
(1902).
184 Nolan v. Arnot, 36 Wash. 101, 78 Pac. 463 (1904).
185 Burns v. Stolze, 111 Wash. 392, 191 Pac. 642 (1920).
Is6 Johnson v. H. P. Gregory & Co., 4 Wash. 109, 29 Pac. 831 (1892).
187 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, 196 Wash. 357, 83 P.2d 221 (1938);
King County v. Rea, 21 Wn.2d 593, 152 P.2d 310 (1944).388 Lushington v. Seattle Auto & Driving Club, 60 Wash. 546, 111 Pac. 785 (1910).
189 Chehalis Coal Co. v. Laisure, 97 Wash. 422, 166 Pac. 1158 (1917) ; Lushington v.
Seattle Auto & Driving Club, 60 Wash. 546, 111 Pac. 785 (1910).
190 Boylan v. Bock, 60 Wash. 423, 111 Pac. 454 (1910).
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sought vacation by an independent suit and lost, he was not able to
succeed by a motion in the original action. His only remedy was by
appeal from the adverse ruling in the independent action."'-
In a few instances, attempts have been made to vacate judgments in
equity upon grounds other than fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Though
the court has spoken in terms suggesting that other grounds for equit-
able relief may exist, the actual cases decided on appeal indicate that
a party cannot be very hopeful of success.'92 As an example, relief was
denied where a judgment was prematurely entered without notice,
there being jurisdiction and no fraud.' Even if a judgment is inequit-
able, it will, of course, not be set aside nor will its enforcement be
enjoined, when it was the result of the complaining party's own fault
or inexcusable neglect, as where a party failed to make a proper defense
through his own negligence."'
A final method by which a judgment may be set aside is by a col-
lateral attack thereon. Collateral attack has been variously defined
by the Washington court. As used in this article, it means an attack
upon a judgment in ways other than by proceedings in the original
action or by proceedings in equity to have it set aside." 5
The only ground for a collateral attack is lack of jurisdiction of the
19' Stolze v. Stolze, 111 Wash. 398, 191 Pac. 641 (1920).
192 See Anderson v. Burgoyne, 60 Wash. 511, 111 Pac. 777 (1910) where equitable
relief was granted when a different judgment by default was entered than the facts
alleged warranted.
193 Merchants' Collection Co. v. Sherburne, 158 Wash 426 290 Pac. 991- (1930);
Chehalis Coal Co. v. Laisure, 97 Wash. 422, 166 Pac. 1158 (191D).
104 Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wn.2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
105 This is in accord with RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 11 (1942). This definition
has been approved by the Washington court in Hanna v. Allen, 153 Wash. 485, 491,
279 Pac. 1098, 1100 (1929). "A collateral attack upon a judgment has been defined to
mean any proceeding in which the integrity of a judgment is challenged, except those
made in the action wherein the judgment is rendered or by appeal, and except suits
brought to obtain decrees declaring judgments to-be void ab initio."
The Washington court has several times cited with approval the following definition
in 34 C.J. § 827, 521 (1924) : "A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach the judg-
ment by matters dehors the record, in an action other than that in which it was
rendered; an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some
incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it; any
proceeding which is not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or
modifying such decree; an objection, incidentally raised in the course of the proceed-
ings, which presents an issue collateral to the issues made by the pleadings. In other
words, if the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and contemplates some
other relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important or
even necessary to its success, then the attack upon the Judgment is collateral." See
Thompson v. Short, 6 Wn.2d 71, 106 P.2d 720 (1940).
In In re Peterson's Estate, 12 Wn.2d 686, 725, 123 P.2d 733, 751 (1942), it was said,
"A direct attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid or correct it in some
manner provided by law; and correlatively, a collateral, or indirect, attack on such a
proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect, in
some manner not provided by law."
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court to render the judgment. Such an attack will be successful only
if it affirmatively appears from the record that the court had no juris-
diction. Evidence may not be produced to show facts outside the
record, although such facts might be sufficient to sustain a direct attack,
as under the statutory provisions or in equity.196 Further, the mere
fact that the jurisdiction of a court to render a particular judgment
does not appear of record does not render it subject to collateral attack.
Where the record is silent upon any particular matter, it will be pre-
sumed that whatever ought to have been done was rightly done.19 '
Unlike a direct attack in equity, the fact that a judgment was pro-
cured by the fraud of one of the parties does not justify setting aside
the judgment collaterally.'98 Only if the fraud is such that it deprived
the court of jurisdiction will this be successful and then it is the
jurisdictional factor which is controlling.'99 Barring that, where the
court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and where the court has
adjudged that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant has been
properly acquired and where there is nothing in the record to contradict
the judgment, fraud is of no consequence in a collateral proceeding.2 0 0
The basic reason for the strictness of the rule in a collateral attack
is founded on the consideration that the regular and orderly way of
trying the validity of judgments is by an appeal or under the statutes
in the cause itself or by a direct suit in equity. Only lack of jurisdic-
tion, which renders the judgment void, is deemed to be of such conse-
quence as to justify an attack by other means.
There is, of course, no time limit for attack upon a judgment void
on its face for lack of jurisdiction. In such an event, the judgment
may be attacked directly or collaterally at any time.20'
In conclusion, the most obvious means to attack an invalid judgment
is by appeal. There are, however, other avenues of relief available.
In numerous instances a party may rely upon any of several statutes
setting forth specified grounds for vacation. One must strictly abide
196 Brown v. Brown, 46 Wn.2d 370, 281 P.2d 850 (1955) ; Thompson v. Short, 6
Wn.2d 71, 106 P.2d 720 (1940) ; Rowe v. Silbaugh, 96 Wash. 138, 164 Pac. 923 (1917) ;
Scott v. Hanford, 37 Wash. 5, 79 Pac. 481 (1905). One exception to the requirement
of lack of jurisdiction for a successful collateral attack is suggested by Roche v.
McDonald, 136 Wash. 322, 239 Pac. 1015 (1925) where it was held that a default
judgment entered upon a complaint so deficient as to conclusively negative the existence
of a cause of action was void and subject to attack collaterally. The case was later
reversed in Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1927) on other grounds.
197 In re Higdon, 30 Wn.2d 546, 192 P.2d 744 (1948).
198 Peyton v. Peyton, 28 Wash. 278, 68 Pac. 757 (1902).
399 Batey v. Batey, 35 Wn.2d 791, 215 P.2d 694 (1950).
200 Thompson v. Short, 6 Wn.2d 71, 106 P.2d 720 (1940).
201 King County v. Rea, 21 Wn.2d 593, 152 P.2d 310 (1940).
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by the statutory and rule provisions to assure the success of such
proceedings. In a few instances, as lack of jurisdiction and fraud, a
direct suit in equity is proper. If the lack of jurisdiction appears on
the record, a judgment may even be attacked collaterally in other
proceedings.
